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ABSTRACT 
Human error analysis method quantitatively is to be investigated by 
development of tool for analyzing human error in processing industries and oil and 
gas industries. The development of quantitative human error analysis is for the 
improvement of human performance focusing critical industrial location such as 
plant site and offshore. The development of the tools is based on traditional 
analyzing method that has been developed in the past such as Swiss Cheese and 
Human Reliability Assessment. This project aims to develop a tool that will assess 
and identified human error by quantification method for studies and enhancement of 
human performance in processing industries. The development of human error 
identification tools is still new in chemical industries and tool that works based on 
quantitative methods is still not much due to lack of data. In this project, there are 
two case studies used. First is frmn a report on Data Informed Model of Performance 
shaping Factors for use in Human Reliability Analysis, which is for calculation of 
error probabilities. Second is to calculate risk level which is from case study of 
method use for food processing industry in Japan. The result of this project is a 
simple, easy and practicable tool for workers in plant to assist them to evaluate 
human error probabilities and risk level due to standardized factor of error in plant. 
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CHAPTER l INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of study 
Human error is one of the aspects in the study of human factors. In recent 
years, the development, analysis and intervention methods are based on research and 
studies, rather than the computational knowledge. There is slight doubt that 
human errors are one of the factors contributing to the majority of safety incidents 
and accidents which occur within complex systems. Accidents such as that at 
Chemobyl had shown that the need for consideration of human error in high-risk 
systems. Such accidents have improved research and development in human 
contributory factor analysis. Human error identification is critical to assessing risk. 
Human error contribution to risk is assessed through the use ofhuman error analysis 
tools. The role of tools extends in many industries, including healthcare, aviation 
and railways wherever human errors occur within systems. Prevention and/or 
reduction in the number of accidents and incidents require a reduction in human error 
in the system. Human error and accident management involves the prevention of 
human errors, the recovery from errors, and the containment of the consequences that 
result from error occurrence (Cacciabue, et al., 2005). The first step in this process is 
error identification. Identi:(ying the errors that frequently result in the occurrence of 
incidents and accidents may allow the development of appropriate prevention and/or 
mitigation strategies. 
A variety of human error identification tools have been developed to aid error 
identification and classification, involving at least one error taxonomy and some 
including human error quantification. For instance, The Swiss Cheese model is used 
in the risk analysis and risk management of human systems while The Domino 
Effect is a model of chain reaction that occurs when a small change causes a similar 
change nearby, and so on in linear sequence. Fault Tree Analysis (FT A) is a top 
down, deductive failure analysis using Boolean logic to combine a series of lower-
level events. Other tools which are quite similar to FT A are Event Tree Analysis. 
Besides, risk assessment model such as Probability Risk Assessment (PRA) and 
Human Risk Assessment (HRA) are a widely used to evaluate risks associated with a 
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complex engineered technological entity (such as an airliner or a nuclear power 
plant These tools have been used to develop new tools for error and risk 
analysis/identification especially in nuclear, aviation and construction industries. 
However, the application of systematic methods in human error identification is still 
early in chemicals industry. Tools are being developed and data and statistics are 
being gathered. Validation of the basic foundation of human error has been 
developed over the last 60 years, illustrates reliability and growth on a moderately 
concrete establislunent of knowledge. Philosophies about human performance iu 
industries have been distinguished to a point where major contributions to an error 
may be recorded, giving recent safety systems designer and analyst valuable 
structures and techniques. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Human errors refer to the enviroumental, organizational and occupation 
aspect as well as human and individual traits which manipulate the behavior at 
work in a means which can have an effect on an organization's wellbeing and 
safety performance. A straightforward method to observe human error is to 
consider about three aspects: the work, the person and the organization and how 
they interrelate to impact on health and safety associated with human behavior. 
Subsequent to an industrial accident relating individual failure, using human error 
identification tools can identify the canses and contributing human error factors. 
Establishing these underlying causes of an accident/incident is the key to 
preventing similar human error accidents/incidents. 
The quantification of human reliability is based on having statistically 
relevant data of human tasks and the associat.ed error rates. Any similar study could 
refer to the databases and call off the required values and have data that was 
reasonably fit for purpose. The basic problem with quantitative methods is a lack of 
data to form the foundation for the assignment of human probabilities to individual 
task elements. Given that underlying databases are incomplete, experts are asked to 
provide data that the databases cannot provide (Nagy, et al., 2002). This then, leads to 
a combination of subject matter expert opinion and quantitative analysis 
supplementing each other, which is open to criticism, argument and may not even be 
repeatable without careful recordiug of the expert's demographics. Conventional 
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human reliability analyses are useful in the case of routine highly skilled activities, in 
the sense that humans may be said to behave very much like (Nagy, et al., 2002). 
There is not the need for deep thought, consideration and interpretation of the 
operating enviroument. Simple human error analysis methods can certainly be 
adequate. Increasing complexity of the enviroument and the human task however, 
does need a more demanding assessment technique with subsequent validation. 
Human error identification techniques are numerous, and there are many 
papers on each technique. As recorded by Wiegmamt, Rich and Shappell (2000), 
Kirwan (, et al., 1998) describes thirty-eight approaches for error identification. They 
are categorized by type of approach and are critiqued using a range of assessment 
criteria. The development of human error identification tools for studies and 
improvement of human performance are still new in chemical industries. However, 
error analysis tools such as Fault Tree, Event Tree, The Swiss Cheese model and 
Domino effect has been used widely to evaluate error and risk reliability iu 
industries. These tools works based on probability method which is related to the 
frequency of event to happen depending on three aspects of observing human error: 
the work, the person and the organization. Nevertheless, based on these traditional 
methods, a new human error analysis tools may well be developed for measuring 
human error that contributed to human performance analysis in industries. 
1.3 Objectives 
The main purpose of this project is to develop a tool that will evaluate and 
identified hmnan error by quantification method for analysis and improvement of 
human performance in chemical industries. 
• The tool that will be developed is a user-fiiendly which means is simple, 
accessible for user, with easy operating procedures particularly for workers 
(operators and technicians) that are present during the operational process in 
the chemical industries. 
• This tool is design to help and assist chemical industries in reducing and 
more importantly preventing accidents/incidents to happen during production 
operation take place. 
• This tool act as an indicator to personnel in plant of which to specifY which 
process produce higher risk of accidents/incidents to happened, what are the 
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error that should be avoided during the procedures and how to prevent small 
accident which may contributed to bigger problems if wrong measurement is 
taken. 
1.4 Srope ofstudy 
Human error analysis by quantitative means need to be develop by researches 
and studies on well established tools that has been developed earlier. Most of the 
tools are developed based on probability calculation of the certain circumstances 
such as types of accident, root cause of accidents and the like hood of accidents to 
happen. The probabilities for each condition to happen are to be quantified 
numerically and the likenesses of each case to happen are calculated. The study of 
past conventional method such as Swiss Cheese Model, Domino Effect Theory, Fault 
Tree and Event Tree Analysis, Probability Risk Assessment (PRA) and Human Risk 
Assessment (HRA) are important in developing the new tool as these past method is 
a reference to build up a new systematic method. 
The study of error identification is also important, for instance, types of 
accident, root cause of accidents and the like hood of accidents to happen in order to 
know the frequency of events to happen and eventually will lead to the end result. 
The software that has been identified in order to develop human error analysis tool, 
is using Microsoft Excel along with Microsoft Visual Basic 2008. Microsoft Excel is 
a computer application used to create and managed spreadsheets. Microsoft Visual 
Basic 2008 is used to design the program in which consists of two main steps. First, 
is to design the program form, which will be the interface between the user and the 
program. Second, is to include the coding in order to create the program that will 
calculate error probability and risk level according to factors affecting human error. 
1.5 Relevancy of the Project 
Human error identification tool in oil and gas and chemical industries is 
important as there are fewer tools developed for processing industries unlike in 
nuclear power and aviation industries. This tool is to help and assist chemical 
industries in reducing and more importantly preventing accidents/incidents. The tools 
are easy, simple and practicable to use in plant. 
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1.6 Feasibility of Study 
For this project, the first semester will cover the literature review for the past 
conventional method and data gathering of types of accident, root cause of accidents 
and the like hood of accidents to happen. This semester also will cover the 
formulation of methodology that will be used in developing the tool by using 
software that has been identified. Software chosen are simple to use and easy to 
understand to help the development of the tooL 
The second semester will cover the development of tool using the software 
which is using Microsoft Excel along with Microsoft Visual Basic 2008. The 
software is easy to get/downloaded and installed. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Numerous references to human error are connected with high-profile 
catastrophic accident/incident. Nuclear power plant accidents, oil rig fires and 
chemical plant disasters are the evidence to the public and their research towards 
human error analysis. Human error identification tool is developed based from the 
past conventional method used in evaluating human error. Some of the methods are: 
Swiss Cheese Model 
r· The Swiss Cheese Model of "'\1 
Accident Causation 
Some holes due 
Hazards 
latent conditions 
\SuccesSive layers ofclefimses. barriers, A. safeguards ) 
... ~ .. ~•- •<•''"--•-• -~~- ... ~.•••M••••<e•••• '"~·---~-·•·•~"''""'-"' , ··••"~··-•·•~'<"""''-"~n-•••••••.-••·--.,..,,.,,.,,",_' _ __. .. _.,,,.,_ .. ., •·•··•- ,,-•,/ 
Figure l: The Swiss Cheese Model of Accident Causation (Reason et. 1990) 
This model combines the earlier ideas ofboth errors and the systems in which 
humans work, into a complete "Swiss Cheese" model through which errors are 
acceptable to occur, in the book, Human Error (Reason et al., 1990). James Reason 
characterizes the "trajectory of accident opportouity" with "Swiss cheese" form of 
accident causation (Reason et al., 1990). It separates the operation of unsafe acts 
from emotional factors and organizational barrier. The "Swiss-cheese model" is a 
generally adopted model in human factors for explaining accident causation. The 
Swiss cheese model hypothesizes is that in any system there are many levels of 
defense. Each of these levels of defense has little 'holes' (known as 1atent 
conditions') in it which are caused by poor design, decision-making, procedures, lack 
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of training, limited resources, etc. If conditions become aligned over consecutive 
levels of defense, it creates an opportunity for incident to occur. When a combination 
of factors and errors break all levels of defenses, a safety incident occurs." (Carthey 
& Clarke, 2010, p.6). From the Swiss Cheese, accidents occur because weaknesses or 
'windows of opportunity' exist or, else, open up at all levels in the system, allowing a 
'chain of events' to start at the upper level of the structure and move down, ultimately 
resulting in an accident if it is not stopped before such thing occurs. In other words, 
most accidents can be traced back to weaknesses at all levels in the 
system. (Perezgonzalez et al, 201 1.). 
2.2 Probabilistic Risk Assessment and Human Reliability Analysis 
Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) uses probability distributions to 
differentiate inconsistency or uncertainty in risk estimation. The quantitative analysis 
of uncertainty and variability can provide a more complete characterization of risk 
than is possible in the point estimate approach. Risk management decisions are often 
based on an evaluation of high end risk to an individual, for deterministic analyses, 
this is generally developed by the combination of a mix of central tendency and high-
end point values for various exposure parameters). In a PRA, risk is characterized by 
two quantities: 
1. The magnitude (severity) of the possible adverse consequence(s), and 
2. The likelihood (probability) of occurrence of each consequence. 
Consequences are expressed numerically (e.g., the number of people 
potentially hurt or killed) and their likelihoods of occurrence are expressed as 
probabilities or frequencies (i.e., the number of occurrences or the probability of 
occurrence per tmit time). The total risk is the expected loss: the sum of the products 
of the consequences multiplied by their probabilities. It would be of concern if rare 
but high consequence events were found to dominate the overall risk, particularly as 
these risk assessments are very sensitive to assumptions. 
The practice of Human Reliability Analysis goes back to the early 1960s, but 
the majority of HRA methods were developed in the middle of the 1980s mainly as a 
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consequence of the concern caused by the accident in 1979 at the nuclear power 
plant at Three Mile Island. The traditioual approach is first to detennine the Human 
Error Probability (HEP) either by using established tables, human reliability models, 
or expert judgment. One of the methods of HRA is the SPAR -H (Standardized Plant 
Analysis Risk-Human Reliability Analysis) method which was developed to estimate 
HEPs for use in the SPAR H models used in commercial nuclear power plants. 
SPAR-His used as part of PRA in over 70 US nuclear power plants. The formula of 
HEP calculatiou by using this method is given as: 
HEP= (Je-2x PSFcompJI(le-2x(PSFcomp.-l)+l) 
Second step is to account for the influence of possible Performance Shaping 
Factors (PSF) such as task characteristics, aspects of the physical environment, wmk 
time characteristics, etc. In the SPAR-H (Standardized Plant Analysis Risk-Human 
Reliability Analysis) method, there are eight PSF used to calculate HEP (Boring and 
Blackman 2007).. This influence is expressed as a numerical factor that is used to 
modifY the basic HEP. HRA methods in practice turned out not to be sufficiently 
effective and the need for substantial improvements was gradually realized. In 1990, 
this was expressed as a criticism against HRA on the following points (Dougherty, 
1990): 
• Existing empirical data are insufficient to support quantitative predictions 
of human performance in complex systems. 
• Expert judgments can be used in lieu of empirical data, but there is a lack 
of agreement in the use of expert judgment methods. 
• Data from simulator studies can be used instead of empirical data, but the 
calibratiou to real life situatious is inadequate. 
• The accuracy of predictions frmn HRA methods ts debatable and 
generally unproved, particularly for non-routine tasks. 
• The psychological realism in most HRA methods is inadequate. 
• The treatment of important Performance Shaping Factors is inadequate. 
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Considering the historical basis for HRA methods, it is reasonable to suggest 
that one improvement should be a better integration of psychological theory with 
HRA models and methods. 
2.3 Performance Shaping Factor 
Whether the task type is determined to be diagnosis, action, or some 
combination of the two, this section presents in order corresponding to the SPAR-
R worksheets, general definitions for the PSFs that constitute part of the analysis 
process. The following PSF multiplier level assignments are applied to the nominal 
HEP as appropriate for computing HEP. The derivation of the SPAR-H PSF 
multipliers is documented in (Boring and Blackman, 2007). 
1. Available Time 
Available time refers to the amount of time that an operator or a crew has 
to diagnose and act upon an abnormal event. A shortage of time can affect the 
operator's ability to think clearly and consider alternatives. It may also affect the 
operator's ability to perform. Definitions differ somewhat, depending on 
whether the activity is a diagnosis activity or an action. The diagnosis values 
are provided below: 
Inadequate time- if the operator cannot diagnose the problem in the amount 
of time available, no matter what slhe does, then failure is certain. (Probability of 
failure= I) 
Barely adequate time- 2/3 the average time required to diagnose the problem is 
available. (Multiplier = 1 0) 
Nominal time - on average, there IS sufficient time to diagnose the 
problem.(Multiplier = 1) 
Extra time - time available is between one to two times greater than the 
nominal time required, and is also greater than 30 minutes. (Multiplier = 0.1) 
Expansive time- time available is greater than two times the nominal 
time required and is also greater than a minimum time of 30 minutes; there is 
an inordinate amount of time (a day or more) to diagnose the problem. 
(Multiplier = 0. 0 I) 
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2. Stress and Stressors 
Stress can include mental stress, excessive workload, or physical stress (such as 
that imposed by difficult environmental factors). It includes aspects of narrowed 
attention field or muscular tension, and can include general apprehension or 
nervousness associated with the importance of an event. Environmental factors 
often referred to as stressors, can induce stress in a person and affect the operator's 
mental or physical performance. The assignment and definition of levels of 
stress or stressors is identical across action and diagnosis and action tasks: 
Extreme- a level of disruptive stress in which the performance of most 
people will deteriorate drastically. This is likely to occur when the onset of the 
stressor is sudden and the stressing situation persists for long periods. 
(e.g., catastrophic failures can result in extreme stress for operating persoonel 
because ofthepotential for radioactive release). (Multiplier= 5) 
High - a level of stress higher than the nominal level (e.g., multiple instruments 
and enunciators alarm unexpectedly and at the same time; loud, continuous 
noise impacts ability to focus attention on the task; the consequences of the task 
represent a threat to plant safety). (Multiplier = 2) 
Nomillfll- the level of stress that is conducive to good performance. (Multiplier 
= l) 
3. Complexity 
Complexity refers to how difficult the task is to perform in the giVen context. 
Complexity considers both the task and the environment in which it is to be 
performed. The more difficult the task is to perform, the greater the chance for 
human error. Complexity also considers the mental effort and physical efforts 
required. A task with greater complexity requires greater skill and comprehension 
to complete successfully. Multiple variables are usually involved in complex 
tasks. The multipliers are: 
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Highly complex- Very difficult to perform, there is much ambiguity in 
what needs to be diagnosed or executed. Many variables are involved, with 
concurrent diagnoses or actions (i.e., unfamiliar maintenance task requiring high 
skill). (Multiplier = 5) 
Moderately complex -somewhat difficult to perform, there is some ambiguity 
in what needs to be diagnosed or executed. Several variables are involved, 
perhaps with some concurrent diagnoses or actions (i.e., evolution 
performed periodically with many steps). (Multiplier= 2) 
Nominal - not difficult to p e r form , there is I i tt I e ambiguity in the 
diagnoses or actions. Single or few variables are involved. (Multiplier = I) 
Obvious diagnosis - diagnosis become greatly simplified. There are times when a 
problem becomes so obvious that it would be difficult for an operator to 
misdiagnose it. (There is no obvious action PSF level counterpart. Easy to 
perform actions are encompassed in the nominal complexity rate.) (Multiplier = 
0.1) 
4. Experience and Training 
This PSF refers to the experience and training of the operator(s) involved in the 
task. Included in this consideration are years of experience of the individual or 
crew, and whether or not the operator/crew has been trained on the type of 
accident, the amount of time passed since training, and the systems involved in the 
task and scenario. Specific examples where training might be deficient are 
guidance for monitoring plant operation during apparently normal, stable 
conditions for the purpose of promoting the early detection of abnormalities. The 
multipliers are as follows: 
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Luw - less than six months experience and/or training. This level does not provide 
the level of knowledge and deep understanding required to adequately perform the 
required tasks and does not expose individuals to various abnormal conditions 
(Multiplier = I 0) 
Nominal - more than stx months experience and/or training. This level of 
experience/training provides an adequate amount of normal schooling and 
instruction to ensure that individuals are proficient and exposed to abnormal 
conditions. (Multiplier= 1) 
High - extensive experience. This level of experience/training provides operators 
with extensive knowledge and practice in a wide range of potential scenanos. 
(Multiplier = 0 .I) 
5. Procedures 
This refers to the existence and use of formal operating procedures for the tasks 
under consideration. Conunon problems seeu in event investigations for procedures 
include situations where procedures give wrong or inadequate information regarding 
a particular control sequence. Another common problem is the ambiguity of steps. 
The multipliers are as follows: 
Not available -the procedure needed for a particular task is not available. 
(Multiplier = 50) 
Incomplete - information needed is not contained in the procedure (Multiplier= 20) 
Available, but poor- a procedure is available but it is difficult to use because of 
ambiguity, or lack in consistency that it impedes performance. (Multiplier= 5) 
Nominal -procedures are available and enhance performance. (Multiplier= 
1) 
Diagnosticlsymptom oriented - diagnostic procedures assist the operator/crew iu 
correctly diagnosing the event. Symptom-oriented procedures provide the means 
to maintain critical safety functions. These procedures allow operators to 
maintain the plant in a safe condition, without the need to diagnose the event 
(Multiplier= 0.5; diagnosis only) 
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6. Ergonomics and HMI 
Ergonomics refers to the equipment, displays and controls, layout, quality, and 
quantity of information available from instrumentation, and the interaction of 
the operator/crew with the equipment to carry out tasks. The adequacy or 
inadequacy of computer software is also included in this PSF. The PSF levels 
are: 
Missing/Misleading- the required instrumentation fails to support diagnosis or 
post diagnosis behavior, or the instrumentation is inaccurate (Multiplier = 50) 
Poor- the design of the plant negatively impacts task performance (e.g., poor 
labeling, , or poor computer interfaces).(Multiplier =20) 
Nominal- the design of plant supports correct performance, but don't enhance 
performance (e.g. operators provided useful labels; the computer interface is 
plenty.(Multiplier = 1) 
Good- the design of the plant positively impacts performance, providing needed 
information and ability to carry out tasks in a way that lessens error. (Multiplier = 
0.5) 
7. Fitness For Duty 
Fitness for duty refers to whether or not the individual performing the task is 
physically and mentally fit to perform the task at the required time. Fitness for 
duty includes factors associated with individuals, but not related to training, 
experience, or stress. The levels are: 
Unfit- the individual is unable to carry out the required tasks, due to illness or 
other physical or mental incapacitation. (Probability of failure = 1) 
Degraded fitness -the individual is able to carry out the tasks, although 
performance is negatively affected. Mental and physical performance can be 
affected if an individual is ill, overconfident in their abilities to perform, 
experiencing fatigue from long duty hours, taking cold medicine or being 
distracted by personal matters. (Multiplier = 5) 
Nominal- individual able to carry out tasks; there is no known performance 
degradation(Multiplier = 1) 
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8. Work Processes 
Refers to work including inter-organizational, safety cnlture, work planning, 
communication, and management support and policies. How work is planned, 
communicated, and executed can affect individual and crew performance. Work 
processes include consideration of coordination, command, and control. Work 
processes also include any management, organizational, or supervisory factors 
that may affect performance The multipliers used in Work Processes include: 
Poor - performance is negatively affected by the work processes at the plant 
(e.g., shift turnover about ongoing maintenance activities; poor command and 
control by supervisor(s); performance expectations are not made clear). (Multiplier 
=2) 
Nominal- performance is not significantly affected by work processes at the 
plant, or work processes do not appear to play an important role (e.g., crew 
performance is adequate; information is available. (Mnltiplier = I) 
Good- work processes employed at the plant enhance performance and lead to 
a more successful (e.g., good communication; well-understood and supportive 
policies;cohesive crew). (Multiplier = 0.8) 
2.4 Numerical Scoring Method incorporating PSF 
The numerical scoring method is considered an addition or multiplication 
method; severity, probabilities and frequency are added or multiplied to calculate 
risk indexes and to determine the level of risk. PSFs can be included in the 
computation. In the risk estimation, C and P = fare determined as described earlier, 
an excision is performed, and the PSF is determined. When the sum of the score is 
less than or equal to four, the human error index is one; when the sum is less than or 
equal to seven, the human error index is two; for all other scores, the human error 
index is four (f. Moriyama, H. Ohtani Risk Assessment Tool Incorporating Human 
error Probabilities in Japanese small size establishment I Safety Science 47 2009).. 
As in the traditional risk assessment, the value can vary depending upon the type of 
hazardous situation. This method of risk assessment is used in the food processing 
industry in Japan. 
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2.5 Tool Development using software: Visual Basic 2008 and Microsoft Excel 
Microsoft Visual Basic for 2008 is an implementation of Microsoft's event-
driven programming language. Microsoft Visual Studio is an integrated development 
environment (IDE) from Microsoft. It is used to develop console and graphical user 
interface applications along with Windows Forms applications, web sites, web 
applications, and web services in both native code together with managed code for 
all platforms supported by Microsoft Windows. VB enables building user defined 
functions, automating processes and accessing Windows API and other low-level 
functionality through dynamic-link libraries (DLLs It supersedes and expands on the 
abilities of earlier application-specific macro programming languages such 
as Word's WordBasic. It can be used to control many aspects of the host application, 
including manipulating user interface features, such as menus and toolbars, and 
worlcing with custom user forms or dialog boxes. VB can also be used to create 
import and export filters for various file formats, such as Open Document (ODF). As 
its name suggests, VB is closely related to Visual Basic and uses the Visual Basic 
Runtime Library. 
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CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Research Methodology 
/ 
Obtaining data, peifomance shaping factor (PSF) multipliers/probability and 
formula for human error probabilities (HEP) calculation 
••• 
' .. 
· .. •···· 
v ~--------------------~~-------------------' 
/ 
The calculation for PSF composite value based on the condition of the eight 




Calculation of average severity, average frequency, PSF level and probability 
level by using numerical scoring method incorporating PSF 
Determination of risk level from the value of severity, frequency, PSF level and 
probability level 
Design the program form and coding based on formula and value calculated. 
The main putput is human error probabilities(HEP) and risk level 
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3.2 Data Gathering 
3.2.1 Performance Shaping Factor (PSF) determination and Calculation of 
HEP 
L The first step in human error identification is obtaining data, perfonnance 
shaping factor (PSF) multipliers/probability, and fonnula for human error 
probability (REP) calculation. These data can be obtained through questionnaire 
survey and research such as thesis and journal from the internet. 
2. Each of the PSF's (from the SPAR H method) each has 3 to 5 condition with 







Fitness For Duty 
Work Processes 
Table 1: PSF Analysis Data 
The calculation of PSFcomp is the multiplication of the multiplier for each 
condition of the factors. The values for the eight conditions of factors are 
multiply together. 
3. The calculation of Human Error Probability by using Perfonnance Shaping 
Factor (PSF) is as followed: 
HEP=(I e-2x PSFcomp.)/(1 e-2x(PSFcomp.-!)+I) 
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3.2.2 Risk Level Determination 
I. To determine the risk level by numerical scoring method, the fonnula given is 
Severity (S) x Probability (P) x Frequency (F) x PSF (H) =Risk Level 
2. The calculations of all the circumstance are based on PSF values. The average 
value for all the eight PSF condition are as follow: 
Average Severity= (Sl+S2+S3+S4+SS+S6+S7+S8)/8 
Average Frequency= (Fl+F2+F3+F4+FS+F6+F7+F8)18 
PSF Level= (Hl+H2+H3+H4+H5+H6+H7+H8)/8 
Probability: 0.99 <': p <':l P=6 
0.5 <': p > 0.99 P=4 
0.01 <': p > 0.5 P=2 
0.000001 <': p > 0.01 P=l 
jsever;ty of harm (S) value Probabilly(P) value Frequency (F) value 





very likely 6 
lkely 4 
IOIIkely 2 









level addllon m~ication 
r.J 23to24 145to960 
Ill 131o22 70to480 
II 7to12 25to69 
I Jessthan6 lessthan24 
laddllon 
t 
Risk(R) (S) + (P) +(F)+ (H) 
lmultiprocalion Risk(R) (S) X (P) X (F) X (H) 
Table 2 : Numerical scoring method using PSF 
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3.3 Tool Development 
I. Visual Basic 
Visual Basic was designed to be easily learned and used by beginner 
programmers. The langnage not only allows programmers to create 
simple GUI applications, but to also develop complex applications. Programming 
in VB is a combination of visually arranging components or controls on a form, 
specifYing attributes and actions of those components, and writing additional 
lines of code for more functionality. Since default attributes and actions are 
defined for the components, a simple program can be created without the 
programmer having to write many lines of code. Performance problems were 
experienced by earlier versions, but with faster computers and native code 
compilation this has become less of an issue. 
Forms are created using drag-and-drop techniques. A tool is used to place 
controls (e.g., text boxes, buttons, etc.) on the form (window). Controls have 
attributes and event handlers associated with them. Default values are provided 
when the control is created, but may be changed by the programmer. Many 
attribute values can be modified during run time based on user actions or changes 
in the enviromnent, providing a dynamic application. By inserting code into the 
event handler for a key press in a text box, the program can automatically 
translate the case of the text being entered, or even prevent certain characters 
from being inserted. 
2 Microsoft Excel 
Microsoft Excel is a commercial spreadsheet application written and 
distributed by Microsoft . It features calculation, graphing tools, pivot tables, and 
a macro programming langnage called Visual Basic for Applications. It has been 
a very widely applied spreadsheet for these platforms. For this project, Microsoft 
Excel is been used for data grouping, tables, data collection, calculation and 
execution of the correct function in order to get the end value/result 
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CHAPTER 4 RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
1. Calculation of Human Probability Factor, techniques used is: 
Condition 
• Performance Shaping Factor (PSF), 
• Human Error Probability (HEP) 
Nominal human error probability; 
Basic human error probability; 
Multiplier Condition Multiplier Condition 
Inadequate P=1 Extreme 5 Highly 
Barely 
Adequate 10 High 2 Moderately 
Nominal 1 Nominal 1 Nominal 
Obvious 
Extra 0.1 diagnosis 
N/A 50 Misleading 50 Unfit 
Degraded 
Incomplete 20 Poor 10 Fitness 
Available 
but Poor 5 Nominal 5 Nominal 



















• This section presents in general definitions for the PSFs that constitute part of 
the analysis process. Note that when an analyst encounters a PSF for which 
there is inadequate infonnation, the nominal assignment is assmned. The 
following PSF multiplier level assignments are applied to the nominal HEP as 
appropriate for computing HEPs. 
of available time 
Barely Adequate 
0.01 1 1 1 
Level 
1 3 2 2 
0.1 1 1 1 
Procedures 
Available but Poor 





G~ 1 1 
Table 4: PSF, Severity, Frequency, and PSF Level Data 
M =Multipliers/Probability S =Severity 
F = Frequency H = PSF 
3 By using Visual Basic, the design of the program is as the form below. From the 
Excel format of the data, the data is been display in the form of questionnaire 
where the user need to choose certain condition there are facing due to the 
performance factor. The button command is used so that is it easier for end - user 
to choose and get the result which is the error probability. 
·. B.Vcu~l-': ~: 'C.~rl.fe~ 
-
"E.lt!Jn! ·::~ .. 
··~ 




··· ::: T~l 
Figure 3: VisuaJ Basic design form 
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4 The coding for the program is to be call for the program to function according to 
what has been decided earlier in the methodology. The progress for the coding 
part for the program is still at early stage where some need to be revised and 
change to suit the program. View Appendix 1 for complete coding. 
~~ f!,,d,:,,,; 
~ !ile il! 1ft """' r.,.. Jl<loj "' l&or ~ !"" - - ~ 
-- ·---·--·------- -·· -· -- -- - --------·--
l!l·a·',_IJ!'IiJ,' !:',A• 1 ,,l!flfofl'lfli'U>~OII 







Figure 4: Visual Basic coding form 
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5 The completed design fonn and coding for the tool are tested and run in 













Figure 5: Human Error Identification Tool 
This tool is a combination of two methods ofhnman error and risk reliability 
assessment. The first part which is the calculation ofHEP, adapted from one ofHRA 
method, the SPAR-R technique. This method used PSF as factor for detennining the 
HEP value. The calculation and fonnula used in the coding of this program is 
validated by calculation of REP value from the actual source of data, which is from 
the dissertation of journal by Katrina M. Groth, Dr ofPhilosophy.2009: A Data 
Jnfonned Model of Perfonnance Shaping Factor for use in Hnman Reliability 
Analysis. The detennination of Risk Level is adapted from a journal ofTetsu 
Moriyama entitled Risk Assessment Tools incorporating Human Error Probabilities 
in the Japanese small-sized establishment. The method used was nnmerical scoring 
method incorporating PSF and the detennination of risk validated by using the same 
fonnula from the journal. 
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION AND RECCOMENDA TION 
CONCLUSION 
As chemical industries is expected to be evolving and increasing by years, the 
implementation of human error identification tools in chemical plant are crucial as a 
method of reducing and preventing accidents/incidents happen during production 
process. This type of setback not only might become hazardous to personnel and 
people involved, but also will affect money, time and production of plant. The 
execution of human error identification tool in chemical plant may help workers to 
quickly analyze action that should be avoided before tmdergoing a process. 
This project aim is to develop a human error identification tool that will be 
used to evaluate error and risk in a chemical industries particular) y chemical 
processing plant. The tool developed is based on past conventional method that has 
been used widely as error and risk assessment method in other industries such as 
aviation, healthcare, and nuclear power. The development of human error 
identification tool is essential as there are still fewer method in quantitative human 
error analysis for a chemical plant. 
The process of data gathering and tool development is still ongoing as there is 
a lot of information still to be analyzed and summarized before it is fmalized. This is 
because there are not much data on quantitative method for human error 
identification and also because of the existence of new data in the future that might 
be helpful to this project. However, the outcome of this project is clear which is to 
develop a tool for human error identification quantitatively for chemical industries. 
The development of Human Error Identification Tool consists of two main 
output data which is 1rrst the human error probability and second is risk level 
determination. The tool is a simple, easy and practicable for use in chemical plant. 
This tool aims to assist workers (operators) in plant to evaluate error probability and 
risk level before the start of the plant operation. With the help of this tool, it is 
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hopeful that this tool will help to prevent and reduce accident from occurring in 
processing plant. 
RECOMMENDATION 
There are several recommendations that can he done to achieve better results 
for this tool. First, the software Microsoft Visual Basic 2008 is a simple and easy 
program for beginners to manage a project. A more complex and refined program 
should be used in order to produce a better and excellence Human Error Tools which 
will evaluate error probabilities and risk more efficiently with more correct data. 
Second recommendation is the availability of data that needed for the development 
of the tool. In this project, the data used is a general for plant cases. For the 
improvement in future, more data needs to he gathered particularly study case and 
research involving oil and gas and chemical plant. Although those type of data are 
still not much, in years to come, the availability of data will helps to develop a more 
efficient and complete tool in the future. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1 : Tool Coding Form 
Public Class Forml 
Dim a, b, c, d, q, f, g, h, AP As Decimal 
Dim al, bl, cl, dl, ql, fl, gl, hl As Decimal 
Dim a2, b2, c2, d2, q2, f2, g2, h2 As Decimal 
Dim a3, b3, c3, d3, q3, f3, g3, h3 As Decimal 
Dim risk As Decimal 
Private Sub Submit_Click(ByVal sender As System.Object, ByVal e 
As System.EventArgs) Handles Submit.Click 
BackColor = Color.White 










If R2.Checked Then 





If R3.Checked Then 
a = 1 
a = 3 
a = 2 
a = 2 
End If 
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If R4.Checked Then 





If R5.Checked Then 





If Y6.Checked Then 





If Y7.Checked Then 





If Y8.Checked Then 





If C9.Checked Then 





If ClO.Checked Then 
c = 2 





If C11. Checked Then 





If C12.Checked Then 





If 1'113 . Checked Then 





If W14.Checked Then 





If W15.Checked Then 





If W16.Checked Then 
d ~ 1 





If W17.Checked Then 





If E18.Checked Then 





If El9.Checked Then 
q ~ 10 




If E20.Checked Then 





If E21.Checked Then 





If I23.Checked Then 
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If I24.Checked Then 





If T25.Checked Then 





If T26.Checked Then 





If T27.Checked Then 





If TRl.Checked Then 





If TR2.Checked Then 






If TR3.Checked Then 





Text14Text = a * b * c * d * q * f * g * h 
Dim EP As Decimal 
1 single(7) I double\15) I decimal (29) 
EP = {0.01 * Textl.Text) I (0. 01 * (Textl. Text 
Text2.Text EP 
Text3.Text (a1 + b1 + c1 + d1 + q1 + fl+ g1 
Text4.Text (a2 + b2 + c2 + d2 + q2 + f2 + g2 
Text5.Text (a3 + b3 + c3 + d3 + q3 + f3 + g3 




If I22.Checked Then 
f = 1 
Text2.Text 1 
End If 
If Text2.Text >= 0.99 And Text2.Text <= 1 Then 
AP = 6 
Else If Text2. Text >= 0.5 And Text2.Text < 0.99 
AP = 4 
E1seif TextZ.Text >= 0. 01 l'Jld Text2.Text < 0.5 
AP = 2 










risk= AP * Text3.Text * Text4.Text * Text5.Text 
If risk >= 480 And risk <= 960 Then 
Text6.Text = "Level IV" 
Elseif risk >= 70 lL~d risk < 480 Then 







0 Or h 
End 
Elseif risk >~ 25 And risk <~ 69 Then 
Text6.Text = "Level II" 
Elseif risk <~ 24 Then 
Text6~Text = "Level I" 
End If 
If a ~ 0 Or b ~ 0 Or c 0 Or d 0 Or q 
~ 0 Then 




































MsgBox("Please answer all question!"} 
End If 
Sub 
0 Or f 0 Or g 
Private Sub Textl_TextChanged(ByVal sender As System.Object, 
ByVal e As System.EventArgs) Handles Textl.TextChanged 
End Sub 
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Private Sub Text2_TextChanged(ByVal sender As System.Object, 
ByVal e As System.EventArgs) Handles Text2.TextChanged 
End Sub 
Private Sub Forml_Load(ByVal sender As System.Object, ByVal e As 
System.EventArgs) Handles MyBase.Load 
End Sub 
Private Sub Reset_Click(ByVal sender As System.Object, ByVal e 
As System.EventArgs) Handles Reset.Click 





































Private sub Wl3_CheckedChanged(ByVal sender As System.Object, 
ByVal e As System.EventArgs) Handles Wl3.CheckedChanged 
End Sub 
Private Sub Y6_CheckedChanged(ByVal sender As System.Object, 
ByVal e As System.EventArgs) Handles Y6.CheckedChanged 
End Sub 
End Class 
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